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Behavioral Economics, Internet Search, and 
Antitrust 
ADAM CANDEUB∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Google’s domination of online search in Europe and the United 
States has attracted antitrust scrutiny.1 The Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC” or “the commission”) recently concluded an 
investigation but declined to take major enforcement action,2 and 
investigation of the European Commission (“EC”) continues to drag 
on.3 These investigations covered a variety of allegedly anti-
competitive behavior, such as “manipulat[ing] Google search results 
to penalize competitors or to privilege other Google products and 
 
 
 
 
* Professor of Law, Director of IP, Information, and Communications Law Program, 
Michigan State University College of Law. 
1 Leo Cendrowicz, The E.U. Probe: Is Google Rigging Its Search Results?, TIME, Dec. 2, 
2010, http:// www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,2034138,00.html; Companies 
Ask EU Commission To Step in On Google Search Ranking Complaint, ITPROPORTAL 
(Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.itproportal.com/2010/02/24/ companies-ask-eu-
commission-step-google-search-ranking-complaint/ (according to comScore, an internet 
data company, Google leads Internet searching in Europe, with an 82 percent market 
share, and enjoys 67 percent in the United States).  
2 Statement of the FTC, In the Matter of Google Inc., F.T.C. File No. 121-0120 (Jan. 3, 
2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemotorolastmtofcomm.pdf. 
3 Frances Robinson, Google Amends Proposal to Settle EU Antitrust Investigation 
Complainants Get Four Weeks to Review Updated Plan, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702303471004579163423647198240. 
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features.”4 In addition, numerous private antitrust suits have been 
filed against Google, though none so far successful.5  
 These regulatory and judicial efforts have failed to fully define how 
search engines can behave anti-competitively.6 On one hand, legal 
commentary identifies numerous potential anti-competitive behaviors 
such as biasing organic search results, placing results from 
competitors in a disadvantaged way on the result screen, and 
excluding competing, specialized search engines.7 On the other hand, 
competition on the web is the proverbial “click away,” strongly 
suggesting that consumer loyalty to Google results from providing 
superior services. Further, remedies for search bias seem unworkable 
as it is far from clear what unbiased search is–and regulating search 
algorithms raises a myriad of legal issues ranging from the First 
Amendment to trade secrecy.8 
 Rather than develop new tools for understanding whether or how 
search engines behave anti-competitively, regulators appear to rely 
upon traditional approaches, not specific to online behavior, assuming 
that market behavior online is not distinguishable from behavior in 
the brick and mortar world. For instance, using typical antitrust 
 
 
 
 
4 Marvin Ammori & Luke Pelican, Competitors’ Proposed Remedies for Search Bias: 
Search “Neutrality” and Other Proposals, 15 J. INTERNET L. 1, 1 (2012) (noting that the 
EC’s “two-year investigation” of Google has lasted several years and continues to drag on); 
Foo Yun Cheem, EU Sees Google Competition Deal After August, REUTERS, Feb. 22, 2013, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/22/us-eu-google-
idUSBRE91L0EJ20130222; Leo Cendrowicz, The E.U. Probe: Is Google Rigging Its Search 
Results?, TIME, Dec. 2, 2010, http:// 
www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,2034138,00.html; Companies Ask EU 
Commission To Step in On Google Search Ranking Complaint, ITPROPORTAL (Feb. 24, 
2010), http://www.itproportal.com/2010/ 02/24/companies-ask-eu-commission-step-
google-search-ranking-complaint. 
5 See Google, Inc. v. myTriggers.com, No. 09 CVH10-14836, 2011 WL 3850286 (Ohio Com. 
Pl. Aug. 31, 2011); TradeComet.com, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010); Person v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-7297, 2007 WL 1831111 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2007); 
KinderStart.com v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057, 2007 WL 831806 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 
2007). 
6 Id. 
7 See Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, What Does the Chicago School Teach About 
Internet Search and the Antitrust Treatment of Google?, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 663, 
664 (2012) (describing antitrust allegations); Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, 
Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
171, 187, 228 (2011). 
8 See infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text. 
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analyses, the FTC found that Google’s search rankings and 
presentation of search results did not warrant further regulatory 
concern.9  Because the cost of search is so low, the FTC reasoned that 
there is little chance that search cost will deter consumers from trying 
Google’s competitors. Prominent critics argued that this conclusion 
applies established Chicago School antitrust teachings in a manner 
unsuited for the new, digital economy.10   
 This Article suggests that online market behavior may differ from 
the brick and mortar world and examines whether traditional 
antitrust reasoning and economic assumptions fully explain search 
behavior. In particular, behavioral tendencies related to habit and 
information costs may disrupt conventional economic assumptions. 
This Article suggests that searching the internet is quite taxing 
cognitively–it is a pain in the neck. Consumers’ desire to decrease 
these cognitive costs may lead people to adopt hard-to-change 
habitual behaviors when using the internet. 
 If we establish habits and routines to allocate our scarce cognitive 
resources, these routines–like many other habits–can be quite 
difficult, i.e., costly, to break, creating high switching costs with 
possible anti-competitive implications. If Google search provides ways 
to lower these costs through convenient access to desired internet 
services such as email, YouTube, or maps, then there could be 
switching costs that develop as Google use becomes habituated. If 
these tendencies are magnified, as they often can be through network 
effects, it is at least possible that anti-competitive results may follow–
so that competition is no longer a “click away.” 
 To expand upon this point, I adopt the terminology of Nobel 
economics prize winner and intellectual pioneer of behavioral 
economics, Daniel Kahneman. He divides the mechanisms for control 
of human action between the automatic and involuntary (which he 
terms “System 1”) and the effortful, deliberate, conscious, and 
introspective (which he terms “System 2”).11 One reviewer explained it 
 
 
 
 
9 See id.; see also infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
10 Frank Pasquale & Siva Vaidhyanathan, Borking Antitrust: Google Secures Its Monopoly 
Dissent, DISSENT (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/borking-antitrust-
google-secures-its-monopoly (“Charged with enforcing antitrust laws and protecting a 
broad sense of consumer welfare, [the FTC] punted on its twenty-month antitrust 
investigation of Google. By doing so, the FTC not only adopted Bork as its patron saint. It 
put those who might hope to create the next big thing, the next Google, or the next 
Facebook, on notice: they should probably defer their dreams. Google will be free to bully 
small and emerging firms without the U.S. government riding to the rescue.”). 
11 DANIEL KAHENMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20-24 (1st ed. 2011). 
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this way: “It is System 1 that detects hostility in a voice and effortlessly 
completes the phrase bread and . . . It is System 2 that swings into 
action when we have to fill out a tax form or park a car in a narrow 
space.”12  
 System 2 is more “costly” in terms of time, effort, and energy, and 
its capacities for concentration and sustained thought. By contrast, 
System 1’s largely automatic processes are instinctual or habitual. 
People can execute them with minimal use of cognitive effort. Indeed, 
we prefer System 1, often avoiding situations that require effortful 
reasoning.13  
 Framed in terms of System 1 versus System 2 tradeoffs, it is easy 
to see why consumers may elect to stick with a familiar web service, 
even when presented with claims of superiority by a rival, and why 
significant market share advantages, once established, may erode only 
slowly over time, if at all. In short, contrary to many assumptions in 
this debate, the cognitive cost of the click that initiates a switch to a 
competing service can be quite high. 
  A firm could take advantage of such switching costs with anti-
competitive results. For example, Google is more than a search 
engine. Through its links to services such as news, email, and 
YouTube, Google provides a gateway to the web that minimizes search 
time–and thereby the cognitive and time costs of using the web. 
Habit, as furthered by network effects, could further lower these 
cognitive costs. 
 To adopt a metaphor from graph theory, a dominant search engine 
may constitute a “minimum spanning tree.” These trees, which are 
mathematically defined concepts, connect “a set of points 
(representing cities, homes, or other locations) by the smallest 
amount of roadway, wire, or pipe.”14 Google might serve as the 
internet’s minimum spanning tree where the connection medium is 
not wire or pipe but cognitive cost or effort. In this sense, a dominant 
search engine could become a type of essential facility and thus raise 
antitrust issues. 
 This Article examines the current state of regulation of search 
engines and sketches a story of how behavioral economic tendencies, 
 
 
 
 
12 Jim Holt, Two Brains Running, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/ books/review/thinking-fast-and-slow-by-daniel-
kahneman-book-review.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
13 KAHENMAN, supra note 11, at 39-48.   
14 STEVEN S. SKIENA, THE ALGORITHM DESIGN MANUAL 192 (2010). 
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particularly those related to habit and Kahneman’s System 1, could 
create significant costs for consumers to switch search engines. This 
article also suggests how these tendencies might render a search 
engine a type of “essential facility.” which would of course raise 
antitrust concerns. A dominant search engine could become the 
cheapest way to access the web for most people, with competitors shut 
out because of high switching costs in terms of cognitive effort. 
Without putting forth a detailed antitrust case, this Article suggests a 
new way to analyze market power on the web that supports the 
possibility of viewing a dominant search engine as an essential facility. 
Finally, this Article responds to some of the objections to using 
behavioral approaches to antitrust. 
II. THE CURRENT DEBATE AND RECENT REGULATORY ACTION 
 The question of whether Google’s domination of the search market 
constitutes an antitrust violation has been debated for many years. 
With the FTC action in January 2013, this legal struggle has entered a 
new phase. The following section discusses the nature of the 
allegations against Google and how the FTC responded. This section 
concludes by questioning several of the assumptions made in these 
legal struggles and policy debates.  
A. Anti-Competitive Behavior By Search Engines 
 Allegations of anti-competitive behavior against search engines 
typically involve search bias–either in a search engine’s organic 
(unpaid for) search results or paid results (advertisements that appear 
on the side of the screen). In recent Senate hearings on Google, some 
complained that Google “‘cook[s]’ its algorithm . . . rig[ging] its 
results, biasing [search results] in favor of [itself].”15 Oren Bracha and 
Frank Pasquale state the fear in this fashion: Google may “directly 
manipulate the flow of information–suppressing some sources while 
highlighting others–whether on the basis of intrinsic preferences or in 
response to inducements or pressures by others.”16 
 
 
 
 
15 Joshua D. Wright, Moving Beyond Naïve Foreclosure Analysis, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1163, 1189, (citing The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. at 35 (statement of Jeff Katz, Chief Executive 
Officer, Nextag, Inc.)). 
16 Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and 
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1165 (2008); see also Can 
Search Discrimination by a Monopolist Violate U.S. Antitrust Laws?, FAIRSEARCH 1, 
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 This algorithm “cooking” includes alleged Google discrimination 
against other specialty a/k/a “vertical” engines, like Yelp!, in favor of 
its own vertical engines and sites.17 Parties have also alleged that the 
2007 introduction of Google’s Universal Search, which goes beyond 
searching websites to searching “images, videos, news, maps, and 
places,” favors Google’s facilities such as “Google Maps, Google Places, 
and Google Products, over competing specialized search providers, 
such as MapQuest, Yelp!, Foundem, and Nextag.”18  
 In response, many believe that Google has no incentive to engage 
in anti-competitive behavior.19 In a highly influential article, the late 
Robert Bork, famed Supreme Court nominee, appellate judge, and a 
leader of the Chicago School of antitrust,20 and J. Gregory Sidak, 
chairman of Criterion Economics consulting, scholar, and long-time 
Washington telecommunications insider, argue that Google’s ranking 
procedures have one overriding goal: “attract and retain” search 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.fairsearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Can-Search-Discrimination-by-
a-Monopolist-Violate-U.S.-Antitrust-Laws1.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2013) (“Given 
Google’s monopoly grip on search and search advertising, Google’s customers and 
competitors increasingly worry that Google has both the incentive and ability to 
manipulate its search results in ways that steer users to its own (possibly inferior) services 
and away from competitors–and thus deprive these competitors of the customers they 
need to survive.”); see also James Grimmelmann, The Elephantine Google Books 
Settlement, 58 J. OF THE COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. 701, 719 (2011) (the settlement 
“was formally nonexclusive–nothing in it would have prohibited copyright owners from 
licensing anyone else to sell their books. But in a world with orphan works, formal non-
exclusivity will often be practically worthless. Google would have had a good-to-go license; 
its competitors will have no one to turn to.”).  
17 Daniel A. Crane, Search Neutrality as an Antitrust Principle, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1199, 1200-01 (2012) (“In this paradigm, original sin entered the world with vertical 
integration. Once search engine companies began to integrate vertically by operating 
websites, they were tempted to manipulate the previously objective search algorithms to 
favor their own sites in their search results. Thus, in response to a query suggesting an 
interest in finding driving directions, Google might prioritize a link to Google Maps in its 
search results at the expense of MapQuest. Given a sufficient dominance in search, Google 
might then erode MapQuest’s market position over time and entrench Google Maps as the 
dominant driving directions site.”). 
18 Ammori & Pelican, supra note 4, at 10. 
19 See Pasquale & Vaidhyanathan, supra note 10. 
20 See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1993, 
originally published 1978) (Bork’s classic, The Antitrust Paradox A Policy at War with 
Itself, the echt-statement of the Chicago School of economics, argues for antitrust 
intervention only in narrow circumstances). 
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engine users.21 Arguing that this goal promotes innovation, they 
conclude that “punishing Google for being the most effective search 
competitor would harm consumers and thus contradict the recognized 
purpose of antitrust law.”22 They contend that punishing Google 
would limit innovation and “dynamic efficiency.”  
 Bork and Sidak also point out that Internet search is a two-sided 
market. A two-sided market comprises two sets of “customers”: 
advertisers and consumers with Google acting as the platform that 
connects the two “sides.” This market structure gives Google the 
incentive to attract the maximum number of advertisers and users. 
Bork and Sidak go further, positing that this two-sidedness results in 
“Google’s incentives [to] align with promoting competition and 
consumer welfare.”23 Google has these incentives because its largest 
source of revenue is from advertising, and support from advertisers 
depends on consumers using Google. 
 Bork and Sidak believe that because “consumers can switch to 
substitute search engines instantaneously and at zero cost 
constraints,” Google has no incentive to minimize access or to 
somehow limit output or quality to anti-competitive effect.24 To the 
contrary, because Google is a two-sided service, it has the incentive to 
get as many users as it can on-board. If it fails to do so, consumers will 
“click” away. Rejecting the notion that Google can act as a gateway to 
limit competition, Bork and Sidak defend the notion that competition 
is always a click away “due to the Internet’s open architecture.”25 They 
contend that “the openness of the Internet always allows consumers to 
sample competing sites.”26  
B. Remedies  
 In addition to the serious arguments as to whether Google 
presents any competitive problems, the proposed remedies present 
serious legal and practical problems. First, those who do not support 
antitrust action respond that even if Google “cooks” its algorithm, it is 
 
 
 
 
21 Bork & Sidak, supra note 7, at 664. 
22 Id. at 665. 
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 672. 
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unclear how a “raw” search algorithm tastes. In other words, while 
those concerned about search engine manipulation argue for “search 
neutrality,” it may not exist because all search engines employ 
content-based decisions that may very well prioritize for perfectly 
innocuous, i.e., sound business and engineering, reasons.27 Many have 
argued that there are sound economic reasons for allowing “search 
bias” as natural and desirable competition that allows search engines 
to experiment with consumer-beneficial vertical relationships with 
other firms.28 
 Further, even if it were possible, or desirable, to define what 
constitutes a “neutral search,” regulating Google’s search algorithm 
still presents numerous legal obstacles. Such regulation may be 
unconstitutional, as regulating Google’s search algorithm is regulating 
speech and, therefore, entitled to First Amendment protection. 
Eugene Volokh and Donald M. Falk have argued that Google, 
Microsoft’s Bing, and Yahoo! search engines exercise editorial 
judgment about what constitutes useful information and convey that 
information–which is to say, they speak–to their users. In this respect, 
search engines are “analogous to newspapers and book publishers . . . 
and [therefore] are shielded by the First Amendment.”29 Many have 
also argued that trade secret law would bar any forced disclosure of 
the algorithm.30 
 Other proposed remedies recall the Federal Communications 
Commission’s “structural separation” between the Bell Telephone and 
innovative computer services using the phone network.31 They include 
 
 
 
 
27 Compare Frank Pasquale, Dominant Search Engines: An Essential Cultural & Political 
Facility, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 401, 415 
(Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus, eds., 2010), and Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 16, with 
James Grimmelmann, Some Skepticism About Search Neutrality, in THE NEXT DIGITAL 
DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 435 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus, eds., 
2010), and Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine 
Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188 (2006). 
28 See Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, If Search Neutrality Is The Answer, What’s 
The Question?, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 151 (2012); Goldman, supra note 27. 
29 EUGENE VOLOKH & DONALD M. FALK, FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR SEARCH 
ENGINE SEARCH RESULTS 889 (Apr. 20, 2012), available at http://www.volokh.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/ SearchEngineFirstAmendment.pdf. 
30 Manne & Wright, supra note 28. 
31 Adam Candeub, Trinko and Re-Grounding the Refusal to Deal Doctrine, 66 
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 821, 833 (2004-2005). 
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splitting Google into a “general” search company and a “specialized” 
search company, requiring additional disclosure of Google’s search 
algorithm, allowing competitors to crawl (i.e., take electronic 
information from Google’s servers) over its resources without 
reciprocal rights. Even strong consumer advocates find these remedies 
either unworkable or unfair, concluding that such remedies may even 
“threate[n] consumer welfare, competition, and innovation.”32 
C. The FTC Investigation of Google 
 The recent settlement of the Federal Trade Commission 
investigation of Google addressed several concerns related to Google’s 
strategy and market position: (1) Google, with its $12.5 billion 
acquisition of Motorola in 2012, owned certain “essential” patents 
used on smart phones, laptop and tablet computers, and gaming 
consoles. Competitors worried these patents could be used to stifle 
competition;33 (2) the ability of advertisers to manage ad campaigns 
on Google’s AdWords platform and on rival ad platforms combined 
with Google’s use of content from other websites hurt competition;34 
and (3) Google’s search algorithm which allegedly skewed results 
towards Google sites and advertisers, and Google’s “universal search” 
prominently displays targeted Google properties in response to 
specific categories of searches, such as shopping and local business 
searches. Google’s practices allegedly hurt other competitor “vertical 
search” engines, i.e., specialized engines such as Yelp! or Ebay.35 
 The settlement responded to these allegations in the following 
manner. First, with respect to the disputed patents, Google agreed to 
refrain from both seeking injunctions against a willing licensee, either 
in federal court or at the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) or 
blocking the use of any standard-essential patents that the company 
has previously committed to license on fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms.36 Second, Google removed 
 
 
 
 
32 Ammori & Pelican, supra note 4, at 13. 
33 Statement of the FTC, In the Matter of Google Inc., supra note 2. 
34 F.T.C. News Release, Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC 
Competition Concerns in the Markets for Devices like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, 
and in Online Search (Jan. 3, 2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/google.shtm. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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limitations on the use of its online search advertising platform, 
AdWords, to allow advertisers to use, more easily, online advertising 
campaigns across multiple platforms. In addition, Google will give 
websites the ability to opt out of Google’s vertical search offerings, 
while still having them appear in Google’s general, or “organic,” web 
search results.37 
 Third, the FTC stated that it “evaluated Google’s introduction of 
‘Universal Search’”–a product that prominently displays targeted 
Google properties in response to specific categories of searches, such 
as shopping and local business search. In addition, the FTC examined 
“the allegation that Google altered its search algorithms to demote 
certain vertical websites in an effort to reduce or eliminate a nascent 
competitive threat.”38 (As discussed below, “Vertical” refers to 
specialized search engines, such as Mapquest that competes with 
Google’s specialized map search “Google maps”). 
 In rejecting these claims, the FTC engaged in a typical antitrust 
analysis, treating search like any other good. Google produces search 
results, and these results are to be analyzed like any other product. 
Innovation in search is to be weighed against Google’s possible anti-
competitive behavior. The FTC determined that whatever injury 
Google search inflicted on competitors was smaller than the consumer 
benefits of its better search results and product design.  
 Specifically, the FTC concluded that while Universal Search and 
the Google algorithm could harm certain competitors, these Google 
features could be justified as innovations that improve user 
experience.39 The Commission’s analysis was straightforward. It 
viewed the “key issue . . . [as] whether Google changed its search 
results primarily to exclude actual or potential competitors and inhibit 
the competitive process, or on the other hand, to improve the quality 
of its search product and the overall user experience.”40 In general, it 
 
 
 
 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. (“The totality of the evidence indicates that, in the main, Google adopted the design 
changes that the Commission investigated to improve the quality of its search results, and 
that any negative impact on actual or potential competitors was incidental to that purpose. 
While some of Google’s rivals may have lost sales due to an improvement in Google’s 
product, these types of adverse effects on particular competitors from vigorous rivalry are a 
common byproduct of ‘competition on the merits’ and the competitive process that the law 
encourages.”). 
40 Id. 
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found that Google’s search improved consumer experiences so that it 
constitutes “competition on the merits” rather than exclusion.41 First, 
as far as Google’s prominent display of its own vertical search results, 
i.e. Google shopping results, the Commission concluded that Google’s 
motivation was not to exclude other shopping vertical search engines 
but to enhance consumer experience by better answering search 
queries. To reach this conclusion, the Commission pointed to evidence 
“that Google would typically test, monitor, and carefully consider the 
effect of introducing its vertical content on the quality of its general 
search results, and would demote its own content to a less prominent 
location when a higher ranking adversely affected the user 
experience.”42  
 Similarly, the Commission examined the allegations that Google 
acted in an anti-competitive manner in its treatment of competitor 
“vertical searches.” It was alleged that “for shopping queries, Google 
demoted all but one or two comparison shopping properties from the 
first page of Google’s search results to a later page.” The Commission 
conceded that this search could hurt Google’s competitors in shopping 
search in favor of its own “shopping vertical.” Again, it found that this 
search effect reflected a “reasonable product” design. It declined to 
“second-guess a firm’s product design decisions where plausible 
procompetitive justifications have been offered, and where those 
justifications are supported by ample evidence.”43 
D. Assumptions in the Debate 
 The FTC decision made several key assumptions about market 
behavior. As mentioned above, leading Google critics argue that the 
FTC in effect channeled the views of the late Robert Bork and J. 
Gregory Sidak in its decision.44 Bork and Sidak wrote a 2012 paper 
that set for the typical Chicago School arguments against antitrust 
action.45 Their argument, as the FTC appeared to agree, was that the 
costs of getting to Google and its competitors are the same. Or, as 
 
 
 
 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Pasquale & Vaidhyanathan, supra note 10.  
45 Bork & Sidak, supra note 7. 
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Bork and Sidak explicitly say, competition is just a costless click 
away.46  
III. A BEHAVIORAL MOVE IN INTERNET COMPETITION LAW? 
 Departing from standard economic analyses that portray 
consumer choices as deliberate selections among alternatives ranked 
according to their anticipated contributions to personal utility, a 
behavioral model recognizes human tendencies to eschew difficult 
calculations in favor of “cognitive ease.” Or, more precisely, people 
who face costs in thinking in deliberative, analytic ways make 
different choices than they would if choosing were costless–which 
standard economic analyses tend to assume. Generic observation and 
the research of psychologists like Kahneman and Tversky suggest that 
people, in fact, do face such costs. The following section examines 
some background assumptions of a behavioral approach and then 
examines some implications for competition law and internet law and 
policy. 
A. System 1/ System 2  
 In 2002, Daniel Kahneman won the Nobel Prize for his research in 
behavioral economics, much of it conducted with his late colleague 
Amos Tversky. They claimed, contrary to the rational actor model, 
that individuals often make economic decisions without making 
complete comparative benefit calculations. In his bestseller Thinking 
Fast, Thinking Slow, Kahnemann collects the strains of decades of his 
research.47 The result is a remarkably recognizable picture of human 
beings–as sometimes deliberate, calculating and explicitly rational, 
but also often running on autopilot. As Kahneman and others, such as 
Thalman and Cass Sunstein in their book, Nudge, have recognized, 
realizing that people are not perfect calculators of their own utility can 
have important policy ramifications.48  
 Kahneman postulates the existence of two choice systems that 
control human action and decision-making: System 1 does fast, 
intuitive thinking and System 2 does slow, deliberate “hard” thinking. 
 
 
 
 
46 Bork & Sidak, supra note 7, at 672 (consumers “can and do use other search engines at 
zero switching cost and navigate directly to websites”). 
47 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 11. 
48 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2009).  
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System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort or 
sense of voluntary control. System 2 monitors System 1, correcting its 
errors, but System 2 does so sparingly because it faces limits in terms 
of human effort and cognitive abilities.49  
 Human beings prefer for a variety of different reasons what 
Kahneman calls “cognitive ease,” which is associated with System 1 
guided behavior. Human beings are more favorably disposed towards 
words or experiences to which they have already been exposed and 
easily understand. Psychologists postulate the “exposure effect” under 
which we prefer familiar situations because they have been deemed 
safe.50 Easy tasks, guided by System 1 intuitions, put one in a good 
mood.51 System 1 “is generally very good at what it does: its models of 
familiar situations are accurate, its short-term predictions are usually 
accurate as well.”52  
 But, System 1 has biases as well and often makes mistakes. 
Perhaps most important, for the purposes of market behavior, is 
System 1’s avoidance of careful rational calculation in favor of an 
established habit–even when careful calculation would result in a 
better, “more rational” choice. Further, System 1 “cannot be turned 
off.”53 Thus, individuals can persist in System 1-guided behaviors even 
though it may seem “rational” to make other choices.  
 Further exacerbating the possibility of persisting in System 1-sub 
optimal results, human beings do not like to use “System 2.” The 
possibility of sub-optimal results is quite real because System 2 is, to 
use Kahneman’s term, “lazy.” It tires quickly because, when used 
rapidly, it consumes limited stores of the energy sources required to 
fuel the System 2 cognitive machinery. People tend to avoid strenuous 
mental effort, as it demands “self-control, and the exertion of self-
control is depleting and unpleasant.”54 This is perhaps not surprising 
as studies have shown that effortful mental activity consumes 
considerably more metabolic energy than System 1 decision-making.55  
 
 
 
 
49 KAHNEMAN, supra note 11, at 408. 
50 Id. at 66-68. 
51 Id. at 68-70. 
52 Id. at 25. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 42. 
55 Id.  
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 It seems quite advantageous, therefore, for businesses to make 
buying their products a System 1-guided habitual behavior. Indeed, 
the annals of capitalism are of full of such efforts. For instance, 
toothpaste never became popular until Pepsodent started to market 
the pleasure of having “film free” teeth and adding peppermint to its 
paste. Apparently, the peppermint played a role as the cue for the 
behavior of brushing and the “film free” teeth became the reward. 
People began to crave the cue–the peppermint–and the associated 
behavior, brushing, because it was associated with the reward: film-
free teeth.56  
 Recent advances in brain science have brought new understanding 
to habit formation, adding support to the cue-reward model. 
Apparently, complex behaviors and sequences of behaviors can be 
“chunked,” i.e., grouped together in the mind as a habit. Such batched 
behaviors are characterized by activity in the amygdala, an area 
associated with non-reflective activity. With chunked behaviors, there 
is little activity from the frontal lobes or other parts of the brain.57 
Thus, it seems at least some support that System 1 and System 2 
behaviors have some basis in neurophysiology. 
A. Essential Facilities and Behavioral Tendencies  
  The question this section examines is whether a firm could take 
advantage of System 1 behavior to make its search engine the portal to 
the web with the lowest cognitive cost. In other words, due to habit 
and web design, a search engine could be the “easiest” way for 
consumers to access those websites and services that they most often 
use. In this fashion, a search engine could be a “minimum spanning 
tree” of cognitive effort–a term examined above. Using any other 
search engine could incur significant switching costs. For instance, if 
one is habituated to using Google shopping, Gmail, YouTube, and 
Google Maps, one would face significant costs in changing one’s 
habits–costs that might be greater than the benefits derived from 
using different search engines. In this way, a search engine could 
become an essential facility and thus raise potential antitrust 
concerns.  
 One of the more controversial doctrines in antitrust law, the 
“essential facilities” doctrine, holds that where there is an input 
required by a particular market and one firm controls that input, 
 
 
 
 
56 Charles Duhigg, The Power of Habit: Why We Do What We Do in Life and Business 56-
59 (2012). 
57 Id. at 12-18. 
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courts can compel that firm to offer competitors access to the input.58 
The essential facilities doctrine is typically set forth as a four prong 
test: (1) a monopolist controls the essential facility; (2) a competitor is 
unable to practically or reasonably duplicate the essential facility; (3) 
access has been denied to a potential competitor; and (4) access is 
feasible.59 If this test is met, a court may mandate access to the 
essential facility as a remedy.  
 Though never formally adopted by the Supreme Court, the 
doctrine derives from United States. v. Terminal R. R. Ass’n of St. 
Louis.60 The case’s history is interesting, and the railroad network 
bears important similarities to the internet. In 1889, robber baron Jay 
Gould and several railroad companies formed a joint venture that 
gained ownership of the railroad terminals that controlled access to a 
key bridge spanning the Mississippi and thereby controlled railroad 
traffic crossing the Mississippi River.61 The bridge was “essential” 
because, in the 19th century, twenty-four railroads terminated at the 
St. Louis hub through which they had to pass to connect to the traffic 
 
 
 
 
58 JOINT COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 
SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE ON THE REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT OF JAPAN 3 
(2004) (“The United States Supreme Court has made clear that it has never recognized the 
essential facilities doctrine, and it recently declined the opportunity to endorse or 
repudiate the doctrine.”); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE, 336 (4th ed. 2011) (arguing that Terminal Railroad 
“involve[ed] an agreement among multiple firms who controlled the facility” and, 
consequently is not a good “ancestor for the essential facilities doctrine”). 
59 MCI Commc’ns v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1133 (7th Cir.1983) (While case 
law does not explicitly explore the concept from an economic perspective, “feasibility” has 
an economic meaning. Access is feasible if a given facility can support multiple efficient 
competitors. This principle can guide access regulation); see also Adam Candeub, Trinko 
and Re-Grounding the Refusal to Deal Doctrine, 66 UNIV. OF PITT. L. REV. 821, 829-30 
(2005) (“Under MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, usually identified as the most 
significant modern explication of the doctrine, the essential facilities four-part test requires 
a showing of ‘(1) control of the essential facility by the monopolist; (2) a competitor’s 
inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use 
of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility’. . . . the 
Supreme Court never has recognized this doctrine and declined to rule on it in Trinko, but 
support for the doctrine is generally believed to be found in the Terminal Railroad case.”). 
60 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n. of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 391-92, 411 (1912). 
61 Id. at 391-95; see also Keith N. Hylton, Economic Rents and Essential Facilities, 1991 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1243, 1273. 
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to the West.62 The Supreme Court, as a remedy, required Gould’s joint 
venture to allow non-member railroads use of the terminal railroads 
that accessed the bridge on ‘just and reasonable terms,” i.e., the 
ancient standard for common carriage rates.63  
 Could a search engine be an essential facility? The definition is 
famously vague. It requires that there be some input that, like the 
bridge over the Mississippi River and the surrounding railroad 
network around St. Louis, cannot be practically reproduced. On one 
hand, saying Google is an essential facility is absurd. After all, there 
are thousands of competitor search engines. Unlike having to travel 
hundreds–perhaps thousands–of miles to access another railroad 
bridge over the Mississippi, one need only type in a different name in 
the URL bar.   
 Some “argue that Google’s ranking of its specialized results above 
competitors’ results deprives competitors of an essential facility: being 
displayed high on a Google search results page.”64 Bork and Sidak 
demolish this idea. Going through the legal prongs, they conclude that 
“Google general search pages are not an essential facility controlled by 
a monopolist,” for the simple reason that Google is not a monopolist.65 
There are plenty of competitor search engines. Similarly, as far as the 
second prong: “a competitor is unable to practicably or reasonably 
duplicate the essential facility,”66 Bork and Sidak argue that 
competitor search engines do, in fact, duplicate what Google does. 
Third, Bork and Sidak deny that Google “blocks” access to a potential 
competitor by placing the competitor lower down on the search result 
page. Rather, they argue that:  
For a competitor not to be ranked within the top search 
results does not imply that Google has denied access to 
this spot. It simply means that Google’s algorithm has 
determined that other links are more likely to answer a 
consumer’s particular query . . . Any competitor can 
 
 
 
 
62 James R. Ratner, Should There Be An Essential Facility Doctrine?, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
327, 335 (1988). 
63 Hylton, supra at 61, at 1274. 
64 Bork & Sidak, supra note 7, at 666. 
65 Id. at 679. 
66 Id. 
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become a top search result by providing the site that 
consumers want to visit the most.67  
 Finally, they point out that demanding access to Google’s top 
ranked results would involve intractable problems.68 Google would 
lose the marketing costs expended to encourage consumers to use its 
services, and competitors would lose incentives to build their own.69 
Further, Google would likely have to disclose its search algorithm, and 
courts or regulators would have to impose a “neutral” algorithm–a 
problematic remedy as discussed above on regulatory and First 
Amendment grounds. 
 But, this Article’s interpretation of Google’s essential facility 
differs from that of Bork and Sidak. It questions their initial claim that 
the Google’s essential facility is its search results. Instead, Google’s 
essential facilities are more plausibly the links above its search box, 
notably its YouTube and Google Books links. Or, even more broadly, 
the portal or interface that Google provides to the web. These well-
chosen links provide easy, low cognitive access to the web, particularly 
if Google use is reinforced by habit. In this way, people use Google 
because System 1 drives its use and switching to a competing search 
engine would require System 2 analysis–something human beings 
tend to avoid. 
 Google’s acquisition of highly used, often unique internet 
resources, such as YouTube and Google Books, and Google’s 
placement of their links in easy-to-find places may reflect an effort to 
encourage habit formation and perhaps consign a consumer’s use of 
Google to System 1. Consider Google’s browser page. Its links, such as 
Google News, YouTube, Gmail, Google Books, combine web resources 
that arguably constitute a constellation of the best specialized search 
engines on the web. The YouTube video collection is truly unique and 
impossible to replicate because it reflects millions of videos from 
millions of viewers collected over many years.70  
 
 
 
 
67 Id. at 682. 
68 Id. at 684-85. 
69 Id. at 685. 
70 John B. Meisel, Economic and Legal Issues Facing Youtube and Similar Internet 
Hosting Web Sites, 12 J. INTERNET L. 1, 10 (2009) (“The numbers depicting the current 
audience and inventory of available uploaded video clips for YouTube are staggering. Users 
access YouTube’s Web site to view more than a billion video clips most days. YouTube has, 
by far, the largest market share (about 34 percent) for online video Web sites with an 
audience estimated at 78 million unique monthly visitors in the United States.”). 
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 Similarly, the Google book repository–while potentially replicable 
by a firm with enough money–reflects years of technical and legal 
investment. While it is certainly true that anyone can scan books, the 
Google Books settlement–the legal resolution of numerous copyright 
claims–arguably puts Google Books in a unique situation. Indeed, the 
Google settlement, which creates the Book Rights Registry and has 
exclusive authority to collect fees for orphaned works, has rendered it 
essential because it has become the de facto exclusive clearinghouse 
for copyright holders. As James Grimmelman points out, the 
settlement “puts Google in a highly privileged position for book search 
and book sales . . . The authors and publishers settled voluntarily with 
Google, but there is no guarantee they will offer similar terms, or any 
terms at all, to anyone else.”71 Further, as Grimmelman points out, the 
settlement gives Google the ability to offer books at low transaction 
costs: it allows “Google a clean release from the transaction-cost 
madness. All those pesky claims from authors who cannot be found or 
will not play ball just go away.”72 
 The point is not that Google search–or even YouTube or Google 
Books–constitutes an “essential facility” under the classic MCI 
definition discussed above. Rather, Google’s strategy of acquiring 
properties, such as YouTube and Google Books, and placing them on 
its launch page makes Google an ever more attractive place to begin 
one’s internet search. And it increases one’s likelihood of staying on 
Google and Google-owned internet property. This use, in turn, will 
make Google, and its property, even cheaper to use in terms of 
cognitive cost, as its use becomes subject to System 1 control–and 
further increase Google’s cognitive cost advantage in relationship to 
its competitors. In this way, Google as a whole may constitute an 
essential facility.  
 
 
 
 
71 James Grimmelmann, In Google We Antitrust, TPMCAFÉ BOOK CLUB, Jan. 15, 2009, 
http://web.archive.org/ 
web/20090119015948/http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/01/15/in_google_w
e_antitrust; see also Randal C. Picker, The Google Book Search Settlement: A New 
Orphan-Works Monopoly?, 5 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 383 (2009) (examining the opt-out 
provision and the antitrust issues it raises); Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and 
the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1308, 1335 (2010) (arguing that the 
settlement create an effective monopoly); but see Einer Elhauge, Why the Google Books 
Settlement Is Procompetitive, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2010) (defending the settlement 
against antitrust law challenge). 
72 James Grimmelmann, How to Fix The Google Book Search Settlement, 12 J. INTERNET L. 
1, 14 (2009). 
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C. Does Google Act as a Sort of “Minimum Spanning Tree of 
Cognitive Effort?”  
 Minimum spanning trees, an important concept in graph theory 
algorithms and computer programming, connect “a set of points 
(representing cities, homes, or other locations) by the smallest 
amount of roadway, wire, or pipe.”73 We take the concept of a 
minimum spanning tree and suggest that Google serves as the 
internet’s minimum spanning tree when the connection medium is 
not wire or pipe, but mental effort. Consider the following set of 
points.74 Each of the lines that connect the points has different 
weights. The bold, unhatched line is the tree that connects all of the 
dots using the lines with the least weight, as Figure 1 illustrates. The 
bold, unhatched tree is the minimum spanning tree of this set of 
points. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 Take this simple idea and apply it to internet search. The vertices 
represent places that people want to go frequently–search engines, 
email services, news, maps, etc. The numbers reflect cognitive cost. 
The minimum spanning tree of the internet under this 
conceptualization is the lowest cognitive cost for getting to these 
places. Figure 2 illustrates this idea. 
 
 
 
 
73 STEVEN S. SKIENA, THE ALGORITHM DESIGN MANUAL 192 (2009). 
74 Minimum Spanning Tree: Kruskal’s Algorithm, PROGRAMMING PRAXIS (Apr. 6, 2010), 
http:// programmingpraxis.com/2010/04/06/minimum-spanning-tree-kruskals-
algorithm. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
If the vertices are all Google or Google-affiliated sites, the internet’s 
minimum spanning tree, would look something like that in Figure 3 
below. 
 
Figure 3 
  
 The antitrust implications of viewing the Google launch page as 
the Internet’s minimum spanning tree is intriguing. On one hand, 
Google’s minimum spanning tree provides an undeniable cognitive 
cost edge against competitors, making entry more difficult and raising 
rivals’ costs. The feedback mechanisms discussed above and the 
acquisition of unique internet services, would increase usage in these 
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sites–which would further lower the cognitive cost of using Google 
sites, increasing the cost difference between Google’s minimum 
spanning tree and any competitors’ way to obtain one’s desired 
material from the web.  
 Viewed in this way, the “Google spanning tree” presents 
interesting essential facility questions. Under the accepted definition 
mentioned above, a (1) monopolist controls the putative essential 
facility; (2) a competitor is unable practicably or reasonably to 
duplicate the essential facility; (3) access has been denied to a 
potential competitor; and (4) access is feasible.75 Google’s minimum 
spanning tree could pass that test.  
 First, Google by definition has exclusive control over the spanning 
tree. Second, a competitor really cannot practically duplicate the 
spanning tree. Recall that Bork and Sidak point out that Google is not 
a monopolist because there are plenty of other search engines.76 But, 
Google’s minimum spanning tree is unique in two ways. Because 
frequent use lowers the cost of using it and transiting to other sites, 
Google offers its users a way to interface at a uniquely lower cost. 
While there are many search engines, only Google offers its unique 
cost profile for navigating the web. Further, competitors cannot 
duplicate many of Google internet resources, such as YouTube and 
Google Books. These unique resources, of course, increase use and 
further decrease the cognitive cost of using Google. 
 Third, by definition, Google does not provide access to its unique, 
low cost way of access the web. Fourth and finally, a dominant search 
engine could give “access” by sharing some of the links on its launch 
page with competitors in some fashion. The precise contours of such 
access are beyond the scope of this Article.  
D. Empirical Support for this Story  
 Whether habit-driven online behavior, in fact, develops in order to 
avoid high search costs and, in turn, creates high switching costs once 
a habit is in place is, of course, an empirical question. If people do not 
place a high cognitive cost on internet searching, then it is unlikely 
that they will develop habits to avoid such search. Thus, this set of 
 
 
 
 
75 MCI Commc’ns v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-1133 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 891 (1983). While case law does not explicitly explore the concept from an 
economic perspective, “feasibility” has an economic meaning. Access is feasible if a given 
facility can support multiple efficient competitors.  
76 Bork & Sidak, supra note 7, at 667. 
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behavioral concerns would have no implications for regulatory policy 
whatsoever. 
 A growing body of empirical research suggests that consumers 
find search activities on the internet to be extremely costly–and avoid 
these costs through habit and other heuristics that may results in sub-
optimal market results. First, an early and consistent finding is that 
people do not like search and do not do very much of it–despite it 
being only a click away. For instance, Eric J. Johnson and his co-
authors found almost a decade ago that consumers in fact do very few 
searches and do not extensively review these searches. Johnson and 
his co-authors propose that cognitive costs associated with search 
create a type of lock-in behavior.77   
 More recent studies make similar findings. Erik Brynjolfsson, 
Astrid A. Dicky, and Michael D. Smith show that price dispersion 
persists in the Internet and that this dispersion is largely due to search 
cost.78 Most recently, Lynn Sillipigni Connaway, Timothy J. Dickey, 
and Marie L. Radford, show in a large study of information seeking in 
academic and everyday environments that time and convenience is a 
dominant factor in information-seeking behaviors.79   
 Anindya Ghose and Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, using various 
techniques to quantify the cost of time and effort and benefits of 
incremental search, find that on average, the effort of continuing to 
search an extra page on search engines costs $39.15, while the effort of 
continuing to search an additional screen position on the same page 
costs $6.24.80 Other researchers have quantified that effort at $43.80 
 
 
 
 
77 Eric J. Johnson et al., On the Depth and Dynamics of Online Search Behavior, 50 MGMT. 
SCI. 299 (2004). 
78 Erik Brynjolfsson, Astrid A. Dick & Michael D. Smith, A Nearly Perfect Market? 
Differentiation vs. Price In Consumer Choice, 8 QUAN. MARKET ECON. 2 (2010). 
79 Lynn Silipigni Connaway, Timothy J. Dickey & Marie L. Radford, “If It Is Too 
Inconvenient, I'm Not Going After It:” Convenience as a Critical Factor In Information-
Seeking Behaviors, 33 LIBR. & INFO. SCI. RES. 179 (2011). 
80 Anindya Ghose, Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis & Beibei Li, Search Less, Find More? Examining 
Limited Consumer Search with Social Media and Product Search Engines, in THIRTY 
THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS (2012).  
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per page.81 Brynjolfsson et al. found that the benefits from searching 
lower screens equal $6.55 for the median consumer.82 
 Not only are search costs high in terms of cognitive cost and effort, 
but firms may in fact strategically increase them. Glenn Ellison and 
Sara Fisher Ellison have identified internet firms’ strategy of 
intentionally obfuscating pricing, making consumer search more 
difficult thereby allowing firms to raise prices. The authors link these 
strategies to high observed levels of price dispersion, which suggests a 
less than perfect market.83  
 In short, a considerable body of evidence shows that consumers 
face high search costs, and these costs affect consumer behavior and 
pricing. If consumers face significant costs, then a search engine that 
uses habit and web design to reduce these costs could have significant 
competitive advantages–perhaps rendering it the “lowest cognitive 
cost”/minimum spanning tree portal to the web. This vision of 
consumer behavior and search would suggest a new and different type 
of essential facility. The empirical evidence demonstrating high search 
cost suggests that, in fact, Google could operate as an essential facility. 
Through System 1 habituation and strategic acquisition and provision 
of key internet resources like YouTube and Gmail, Google provides a 
unique low cost portal to the web. Switching costs to other firms is too 
high because competitors face a chicken-and-egg problem in 
replicating this low cost access: the lowered cost only comes through 
System 1 habituation, and searching competitors requires consumers 
to use System 2. More research, of course, would be necessary to 
establish whether this story is borne out by the facts. 
IV. RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS 
 Applying behavioral economics into antitrust and consumer 
protection regulation are very controversial and very much in the 
news. The Obama administration has embraced much of behavioral 
economics–or at least has embraced individuals who have embraced 
them. For instance, Cass Sunstein, a leading exponent of behavioral 
 
 
 
 
81 Sergei Koulayev & Ting Wu, Search With Dirichlet Priors: Estimation and Implications 
for the Price Elasticity of Demand (March 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1305665. 
82 Brynjolfsson et al., supra note 78. 
83 Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the 
Internet, 77 ECONOMETRICA 427 (2009).   
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economics, recently served as the administrator for Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs.84 The recently created 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau also boasts noted 
behavioral advocates in its management ranks, notably Harvard 
economist, Sendhil Mullainathan. 
 The ascendency of behavioral economics in policy circles–in 
addition to important scholars advocating its use in antitrust law85–has 
prompted a vigorous scholarly response. Notably, Joshua Wright, now 
a commissioner at the FTC, has written several attacks (along with co-
authors Judd Stone86 and Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit87) on the use of behavioral economics 
as a basis for regulation and antitrust regulation in particular.  
 Wright & Stone identify several cognitive or behavioral biases as 
central to the claims to behavioral economics and reject each as 
forming a sufficient basis to abandon the rational actor model for 
antitrust regulation. Among these important biases are (i) 
contextualizing biases, i.e., the endowment effect which makes 
individuals “reluctant to sell a good endowed to them when offered a 
sum greater than they are willing to pay to acquire the good” and (ii) 
self-control problems, such as hyperbolic discounting, discussed 
above, and optimism bias in which people underestimate the 
probability of bad results.88 
 In rejecting these biases as relevant to antitrust law, Wright and 
Stone state:  
Behavioralist advocates marshal an impressive 
collection of laboratory and field evidence illustrating 
some deviations from expectations arising out of pure 
 
 
 
 
84 Mike Dorning, Obama Adopts Behavioral Economics, BLOOMBURG BUSINESSWEEK MAG. 
(June 24, 2010), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_27/b4185019573214.htm. 
85 See Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and 
Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482 (2002); Maurice E. Stucke, New Antitrust Realism, 2 
COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L: ANTITRUST CHRON. (Jan. 2009) (for prominent advocates of 
behavioral antitrust). 
86 Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against 
Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517 (2012). 
87 Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, 
Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV.1033, 1036 (2012). 
88 Id. 
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rational choice. What this evidence fails to provide, 
however, are either necessary or sufficient conditions 
for situations in which those biases may affect 
individual or firm decision-making and those situations 
in which they do not.89  
They seem to dismiss behavioral economics as merely adding 
occasional irrationalities to otherwise rational human beings, i.e., 
sometimes we hoard stuff or succumb to the immediate gratification 
of drinking to the higher but longer term payoff to studying.90 Viewed 
in this way, behavioral economics sometimes says, “We’re nuts,” but 
cannot really provide an entire–or even a strong partial–theory as to 
when we will be nuts. 
 Wright and Stone seem to adopt, however, a rather crimped 
definition of “pure rational choice.” The gravamen of Kahnemann’s, 
Twersky’s, and Simon’s work is that, in relying on heuristics or in 
adopting certain biases, people are behaving rationally. System 1 is 
rational; it has evolved over time to offer individuals a low-cost way of 
dealing with cognitive burden, and it generally works well enough. 
While it may come to different answers than the more analytic System 
2, System 1 effectively optimizes limited cognitive resources and, in 
this sense, is perfectly rational. In other words, as Herbert Simon 
argued decades ago, it is not perfectly rational to calculate out to the 
sixth significant digit the expected utility of all our decisions. The 
effort of calculation is too great. Instead, we must optimize our limited 
cognitive resources. 
 The anti-behavioralists forward at least four other main 
objections. Wright and others argue that (i) the behavioralists fail to 
provide a convincing account of individual biases aggregating up to 
 
 
 
 
89 Wright & Stone, supra note 86, at 1522. 
90 See also Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be 
Traded For Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L. J. 67, 73-74 
(2002) (“To be clear, the problem identified here goes beyond the trivial claim that 
behavioral law and economics employs an abstract model of behavior. Rather, the problem 
is that behavioral law and economics ‘proceeds on the basis of inaccurate understandings 
of judgment and choice.’ Whereas law and economics assumes too much rationality on the 
part of legal actors as an empirical matter, behavioral law and economics errs by assuming 
too much irrationality.”); see also Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? 
The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1907, 1945 (2002) (“In fact, when one examines the actual data gathered by decision 
researchers rather than just summary presentations of the data, one finds that at least a 
significant minority and often a significant majority of the subjects provided the ‘right,’ or 
rational, answer to the judgment or decision problem under consideration.”). 
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firms in a meaningful and predictable way;91 (ii) regulators may fall 
victim to the same behavioral biases as those whom they regulate, 
rendering any regulation imperfect or utterly ineffective;92 (iii) the 
failure to identify the “necessary or sufficient conditions for situations 
in which those biases may affect individual or firm decision-making 
and those situations in which they do not”;93 and (iv) libertarian 
concerns that behavioral economics prevents individuals from making 
mistakes and learning from them.94 None applies to the argument 
urged in this Article. 
 First, it does not seem as if the first objection, aggregating 
individual biases to firms, is applicable. The Article does not suggest 
Google is behaving according to System 1. Rather, it is cleverly taking 
advantage of System 1 behavior of consumers who face high search 
costs. Similarly, the second objection–that regulators share the same 
biases–does not have much application. Again, this Article does not 
suggest that people are irrational; rather, that internet design and 
habit create different search costs for consumers using different 
search engines. Regulators’ work simply does not involve the type of 
trade-offs that internet search does.  
 The third objection, relying on the work of Gregory Mitchell, has 
perhaps greater application in this instance. As Mitchell points out, 
many of the behavioral economic biases have been identified by 
psychologists in the laboratory setting under limited conditions. 
Because one cannot easily generalize these conditions, one cannot 
identify on a global basis appropriate for regulation the “necessary or 
sufficient conditions for situations in which those biases may affect 
individual or firm decision-making.”95  
 
 
 
 
91 Wright & Stone, supra note 86, at 1523-24. 
92 Id., at 1522, 1530-34; see also Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government 
Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1628 
n.20 (2006). 
93 Wright & Stone, supra note 86, at 1522; see also Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian 
Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245 (2005). 
94 Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, 
Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV.1033, 1036 (2012) (“We 
argue that so long as libertarian paternalism ignores the economic welfare and liberty value 
of allowing individuals the freedom to err, it will fail to achieve its goal of increasing 
welfare without reducing liberty and will pose a significant risk of reducing both.”). 
95 Wright & Stone, supra note 86, at 1522 (citing Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian 
Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1245 (2005)). 
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 However, that objection has teeth only if you view behavioral 
economics as simply identifying weird human tendencies that for 
some reason make humans deviate from the pure rationality of homo 
economicus. The idea sketched in this Article makes no such claim. 
Rather, building off Simon’s notion of bounded rationality and 
Kahnman’s psychological account of System 1’s economization of 
limited cognitive results, this Article shows how perfectly rational 
tendencies to reduce cognitive cost can lead to one dominant web 
search portal. These claims are, in theory, perfectly generalizable. One 
could in theory specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
these claims’ applicability.96   
 Fourth, this Article’s contribution is only to suggest a different way 
for thinking about firm dominance on the Internet. Remedies or 
regulatory interventions were not yet discussed so it is not clear 
whether these issues would involve any state intervention that would 
impinge upon personal liberty in ways Wright and Ginsburg might 
object to. Further, any remedy that reduces search costs globally is 
unlikely to raise liberty concerns as such a remedy would make 
information more easily accessible. The ideas here do not involve what 
Wright and Ginsburg fear: a regulatory regime that labels certain 
preferences as behavioral and “irrational” and then “identif[ies] which 
of the multiple selves' decisions expresses the individual's “true” 
preferences for the purposes of welfare analysis.”97 Rather, seeing how 
human beings experience the cost of search simply builds upon 
accepted economic notions of choice and preference. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The FTC’s decision was one of the first efforts in the development 
of new regulatory paradigms for the regulation of on-line activity. The 
FTC, however, simply applied one conventional model for 
understanding economic behavior. This article suggests a different 
understanding of how online activity changes economic behavior and 
argues for its plausibility. We stress that this article explores only the 
plausibility of this alternative approach. The extent to which System 1-
guided decision making leads us not to make perfectly rational 
decisions that we might otherwise make–and thereby hurt 
competition in search–is an empirical question. We have too little 
data at this point about how consumers function online to resolve that 
 
 
 
 
96 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 87, at 1053. 
97 Id. at 1060. 
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question. To collect such data would require a new way of thinking 
about antitrust and the inclusion of behavioral and experimental data.    
 
